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Briefing • Global Industry

Behind the Barrel: The Oil Traders Fueling Israel’s Genocide

Research by Oil Change International (OCI) and Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), supported by Data Desk

Research by Oil Change International (OCI) and Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), supported by Data Desk, reveals how two little-known private companies have become important traders of crude oil to Israel.

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Executive Summary

This briefing examines how two secretive oil traders help supply the crude oil that fuels Israel’s ongoing military aggression against Palestine, despite mounting legal findings of violations of international law, including genocide. Drawing on shipping data, it shows how two companies – Vitol and Heritage Petroleum FZCO – have emerged as major players in crude oil shipments to Israel since late 2023. These two companies have collectively delivered 22 million barrels, representing 11 per cent of the country’s total crude imports. This oil is refined into fuels that support, among other things, Israel’s unlawful military and settlement activities. International bodies have affirmed states’ obligations to prevent genocide and avoid contributing to illegal occupation, settlements, and apartheid, including by regulating companies under their jurisdiction that trade or facilitate the shipment of crude oil to Israeli refineries. This briefing highlights a critical gap in states’ fulfilment of their legal obligations.

Introduction

Around the world, people pay the price of Israel and the United States’ illegal military aggressions and humanitarian law violations. In Southwest Asia, their military forces have attacked and displaced millions of people in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran.1 Israeli forces killed more than 26,700 people in Gaza in 2025 alone,2 and in the first months of 2026, Israeli and U.S. attacks in Iran and Israeli attacks in Lebanon led to more than 7,000 deaths.3 Their military aggression has caused wider global impacts, including a “triple shock of energy affordability and availability, food price increases, and GDP downturns” that risks sending 30 million people worldwide into poverty, according to the United Nations.4

Israel relies heavily on imported crude oil. In 2024, for example, the country imported 97 per cent of its crude oil,5 which Israeli refineries then processed into different products, including fuel supplied to Israel’s military. While it is not possible to ascertain the exact level of dependency the Israeli military has on fuel refined in the country from imported crude, the available evidence shows that part of the military’s fuel needs are met this way.6

OCI, SOMO, and many others7 have previously argued for an embargo on the export of crude oil to Israel, given the high likelihood that it sustains or expands unlawful military action. We have focused on the countries that have supplied oil to Israel and some of the most prominent oil companies involved. This briefing looks at a different set of actors, some of the key facilitators: oil commodity traders. These companies, often operating in the shadows, facilitate the purchase of crude oil from oil producers and its sale to end users, both states and private actors. We look at two little-known companies that play a major role in shipping oil to Israel, and highlight the role of states situated along Israel’s oil supply chain and their obligation to take action.

Crude Oil Industry Roles

What is a “producer”?
A producer is a company that extracts crude oil.

What is a “trader”?
A trader is a middleman who buys crude oil from a producer and sells it to refineries or end users. Traders move crude oil to capitalise on price gaps caused by geopolitical events, shifts in supply and demand, logistical bottlenecks, and other changes – aiming to "buy low and sell high." They can act as charterers. In contrast, a financial trader bets on price changes without any ownership of physical oil.

What is a “charterer”?
A charterer is a company that hires a ship for a specific voyage or time period. The charterer organises cargo transport to move crude oil between locations. The charterer may or may not own the cargo.

What is an “integrated oil company”?
An integrated oil company handles everything from production to transportation to refining crude oil into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel and selling it to end users. Integrated oil companies combine the producer, trader, charterer, and/or refiner roles.

A typical scenario
A trader buys oil from a producer seeking to maximise profits by taking advantage of shifting market dynamics. The trader (now acting as the charterer) charters a vessel to pick up the oil and transport it to the end user.

How crude oil arrives in Israel

The vast majority of crude oil imported by Israel originates from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.8 Several publicly listed oil companies, including Chevron,9 BP,10 ExxonMobil,11 Shell,12 TotalEnergies,13 and Eni14 have faced criticism over their role in supplying crude oil to Israel, and in the case of U.S. company Valero,15 supplying military jet fuel.

The role of oil traders has received far less attention, although they are critical to the process of exporting and importing oil. Most are opaque companies with far less name recognition than Big Oil corporations. This research looks at two traders – Vitol and Heritage Petroleum FZCO (Heritage) – that have delivered crude oil to Israel during the genocide.

Vitol has significantly increased its crude oil shipments to Israel since 2023, while Heritage, a company created in 2023, only began shipping crude oil to the country in November 2024 after the genocide began.

Methodology

OCI and SOMO commissioned Data Desk to provide an overview of the shipments of crude oil to Israel since 2023.16 The findings are based on the known “charterers” recorded in the Kpler databaseKpler is an industry-standard data product for tracking flows of seaborne oil and gas. Its assessments are based on a number of data sources, including vessel movements, customs filings, tanker fixtures, and information from shipbrokers, traders, and port agents. Across the shipments analysed in this research, approximately half do not record any charterer., which includes trade data and maritime transfer tracking. This report uses the term “trader” to refer to Vitol and Heritage, where, in addition to acting as charterers, Kpler data indicates they have also bought the crude oil they are shipping. As traders, they adopt the cargo on a free on board (FOB) basis, meaning they absorb the risks and costs of shipping the cargo to the destination. SOMO and OCI reviewed the available data on shipments of crude oil that departed the originating country between 13 October 2023 and 30 June 2026 and were subsequently delivered. We tracked more than 250 shipments containing crude oil from 19 countries, amounting to more than 200 million barrels Kpler records volumes in tonnes. Volumes were converted to barrels using the standard conversion rate of 1 tonne of oil = 7.33 barrels (e.g. as used in the Statistical Review of World Energy “approximate conversion factors.”)..17 Analysing the shipping data, two oil traders jumped out: Vitol and Heritage Petroleum FZCO. These companies respectively increased and started their crude oil supply after the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and quickly became some of the largest charterers of crude to Israel. In addition to Kpler data, the briefing also draws on supplementary data from London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG)LSEG is a provider of data and analytics on markets and commodities., inspection data from Port State Control Port State Control is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules, see the International Maritime Organization website., and satellite images. SOMO and OCI shared key findings with all the companies named in this publication, providing them with an opportunity to comment. Responses were received from Vitol, Shiptech, and Thenamaris and are reflected in this publication.

Vitol and Heritage have emerged as key suppliers of crude oil to Israel since late 2023, together delivering 22 million barrels, representing 11 per cent of the country’s crude oil imports during Israel’s genocide in Gaza.18 Their role may be even larger; around half of the shipments analysed for this research do not list a charter company Across the shipments analysed in this research, approximately half do not record any charterer. Kpler assessments are based on a number of data sources, including vessel movements, customs filings, tanker fixtures, and information from shipbrokers, traders, and port agents.. Companies are not required to disclose their charterers and Kpler data (see Methodology) includes many shipments of crude to Israel where the name of the company chartering the vessel is not listed.

Vitol has shipped oil to Israel for years, but in 2025 it increased its deliveries dramatically to more than four times its average annual volume recorded for 2020 to 2024. Between January 2025 and June 2026, Vitol was the largest named charterer supplying oil to Israel by volume.19 Heritage only began shipping oil to Israel in November 2024, but rapidly increased its shipments over the following year (July 2025 to June 2026) to become the second-largest named charterer by volume according to Kpler data.20

Figure 1

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In the period between October 2023 and June 2026, Vitol and Heritage delivered 22 million barrels of crude to Israel’s state-owned Europe Asia Pipeline Company (EAPC),22 and Heritage delivered an additional 500,000 barrels to the Bazan refinery in Haifa.23

From crude imports to fuel for Israel’s military

The EAPC works under a government-issued secrecy order that covers, among other things, the identities of its shareholders and details of its oil deals.24 The company operates three crude oil pipelines, connecting its Ashkelon port with refineries in Haifa and Ashdod.25 Once refined, products are transported to be consumed or stored, including by the military.26 Approximately 75 per cent of the crude oil imported into Israel and refined in Ashdod and Haifa comes in via EAPC’s Ashkelon port or an EAPC port in Eilat.27

Bazan Group, which owns the Haifa refinery, has been clear that it supplies the Israeli military.28 In December 2023, Bazan posted a video proclaiming “Together, We Shall Win!” and “Even during emergency periods, our gate is open to everyone, providing a supply of fuel for transportation to the energy sector and the military”.29

One of the products the Ashdod refinery produces is jet fuel. Its largest customer, Paz Group, which buys and sells the jet fuel as an important part of its revenue,30 has an agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defence for the refuelling of Israeli military aircraft in seven Air Force bases.31

Figure 2

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EAPC’s Europe-Asia Crude Route

Map of EAPC's Europe-Asia Crude Oil Route

Vitol – the biggest company you’ve never heard of

Sometimes called the “biggest company you’ve never heard of”,32 Vitol is a leading oil trading company, founded in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in 196633 with regional offices in London, Geneva, Houston, Singapore, Rotterdam, and Bahrain,34 and a major holding company in Luxembourg.35 It is among the largest private commodities traders in the world,36 with crude oil and petroleum products at the core of its business.37 In 2025, the company delivered an average of 8 million barrels of oil per day,38 and it made an average annual net profit of more than USD 12 billion from 2022 to 2024.39

Between October 2023 and June 2026, Vitol brought almost 14 million barrels of crude oil to Israel through chartered shipment.40 All of the 16 crude shipments to Israel chartered by Vitol used vessels owned and managed by Greek companies,41 invoking Greece’s international legal obligations under the Genocide Convention and in relation to Israel’s unlawful occupation and settlements. Three Greek companies play a particularly large role: 9 of the 16 crude shipments use vessels that are managed by Kyklades Maritime Corporation42 and owned by subsidiaries of Okeanis Eco Tankers Corp.43 Five of the 16 crude shipments use vessels managed by Thenamaris Ships Management.44 Following a request for comment, Thenamaris stated it complies with international law and sanctions and as a policy does not comment on commercial or operational matters.45 Kyklades has previously responded to media about its vessel ownership role, stating that it did not comment on “commercial operations” but that it followed all international laws and applicable sanctions.46

Between April and July 2025, Vitol significantly increased its crude oil shipments to Israel, with volumes climbing from 1.7 million barrels in April to 2 million in May and reaching almost 5 million in June.47 The short period of increased imports coincides with the run-up to Israel’s attack on Iran on 13 June 2025 and the extension of a long-running secrecy order banning the disclosure of key business dealings of the EAPC.48

Vitol’s long history of corporate controversy

Vitol’s decision to deliver crude oil to Israel during the genocide in Gaza is not the first time the company has been accused of unethical behaviour, including actions that enabled it to profit from war, conflict, and unlawful military action:

2026
Vitol secured the first U.S.-authorised sale of Venezuelan crude oil following the U.S. military kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and taking control of the country’s oil sector.49 The crude shipment was initially destined for Israel, where it arrived in early March 2026 – days after Israel and the United States started their attack on Iran – but departed Israel without offloading.50 A senior Vitol trader involved in securing the contract had made political donations to support Donald Trump’s election campaign.51 He also met with the president days before the agreement was finalised. He reportedly stated that Vitol would attain the best price possible for Venezuelan oil for the United States, so that, as he addressed to Trump, “the influence you have over the Venezuelans will ensure that you get what you want”.52 In its response to SOMO and OCI, Vitol wrote that the trader concerned “made political donations in his personal capacity” and “has since retired from Vitol”.53

2025
In addition to crude oil, Vitol has provided jet fuel directly to Israel, potentially in a moment of supply shortage. On the night of 14 to 15 June 2025, an Iranian strike targeted and damaged the Haifa refinery,54 resulting in at least one crude distillation unit going offline until late August of that year.55 Several days after this event, on 18 June, a shipment of Jet A-1 fuel, chartered by Vitol, departed from the Dangote refinery in Nigeria and arrived in Israel in July. According to Kpler data, this was the first shipment of Jet A-1 fuel to Israel since July 2022. The timing of the shipment from Nigeria raises questions about whether Vitol’s charter of Jet A-1 was a swift response by the company to meet Israel’s need to fill a gap in supply following the Iranian attack.

2023
While EU sanctions had banned the import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products,56 Vitol was accused by the NGO Global Witness of sourcing 900,000 barrels from Turkish refineries known to import Russian crude oil in the first two months following the EU sanctions alone.57 In response to OCI and SOMO, Vitol said that “it has long been the case that the origin of petroleum products derived from a crude oil is defined by the country in which they were refined, not the origin of the crude oil.”

2012
Vitol reportedly acted through a Bahraini branch of the company to buy two million barrels of Iranian oil from a non-Iranian counterparty, after the entry into force of the EU sanctions on buying and selling Iranian oil and shortly before the U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil came into force.58 At the time, it was reported that Vitol was not obliged to comply with a ban imposed in July by the European Union on trading oil with Iran because Switzerland, where Vitol has an office, decided not to match EU and U.S. sanctions against Tehran.59 In a response to SOMO and OCI, Vitol maintained that the company’s “actions were fully compliant with international sanctions”.60 The company did not address the issue of EU sanctions but stated that “[t]he transaction was executed (with a non-Iranian counterpart) prior to the signing of Executive Order 13622 which came into effect on 30th July 2012.”

2007
Vitol pled guilty to first-degree grand larceny for providing $13 million in kickbacks to the Iraqi state oil company under Saddam Hussein in order to win oil supply contracts.61 Vitol paid $13 million in restitution to Iraq and $4.5 million in lieu of fines, forfeiture, and to cover prosecution costs.62 In response to SOMO and OCI, Vitol specified that the first-degree grand larceny to which it pleaded guilty following the Manhattan (NY) District Attorney’s Office charges concerned payments made to the Iraqi state-owned oil company State Organization for Marketing of Oil.63

Responding to SOMO and OCI’s request to comment, Vitol refuted the existence of war or conflict in Venezuela (in 2026) and Iran (2012), and claims it has not profited from war and conflict in Venezuela, Ukraine, Iran, or Iraq. Vitol did not comment on its identification as a charterer of crude oil shipments to Israel or the legal implications thereof.64

Figure 3

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Vitol and Heritage-Chartered Shipments of Crude Oil to Israel During the Genocide

Map of chartered crude oil shipments to Israel during genocide

Heritage – suddenly a top trader to Israel

Heritage Petroleum FZCO The suffixes “FZCO” and “DMCC” are apparently being used interchangeably by Heritage Petroleum and its employees. This can likely be explained by an administrative change for the naming of companies in the UAE as of 2 January 2025, after which newly registered companies will use the suffix “FZCO” or “FZ Branch” instead of “DMCC”, see this update from DMCC. The website, email domain, and phone numbers used are the same across company and staff online posts and platforms. is new among the oil traders and has quickly become one of the top suppliers of crude oil to Israel. The company was founded in December 2023 in Dubai. Little is known about Heritage, which maintains a very basic website65 and a dormant LinkedIn page.66 It is located in the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), a free trade zone consisting of 87 high-rise towers where approximately 26,000 companies67 enjoy high levels of secrecy, zero per cent personal income tax,68 and a potential zero per cent corporate tax rate on qualifying income.69

According to Kpler data, Heritage began chartering crude oil shipments to various destinations in June 2024, with all shipments originating from Türkiye.70 The oil is likely to have come from Azerbaijan as it was from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline,71 which delivers crude from Azerbaijan to Türkiye.

Heritage chartered its first crude oil shipment to Israel in November 2024. Since then, Kpler and LSEG data indicates that the company has chartered 8.3 million barrels of oil to the country across ten shipments, becoming Israel’s second-largest charterer of crude oil shipments to Israel over the past year (July 2025 to June 2026).72

Heritage maintained a steady crude oil supply to Israel throughout 2025, with shipments in January, March, September, and December. In 2026, the tracking data shows that it chartered shipments in February and April, with a peak in February, when it made four deliveries to Israel. Nine out of ten of the recorded Heritage shipments to Israel went to the Israeli-state-owned Europe Asia Pipeline Company (EAPC) in Ashkelon. One shipment went to Oil Refineries Limited (ORL) in Haifa. The vessels used in these shipments were owned and managed by companies headquartered in Greece: all of the ten crude shipments to Israel which are reported to have been chartered by Heritage used vessels managed by Kyklades Maritime Corporation,73 and six of the shipments used vessels owned by subsidiaries of Okeanis Eco Tankers Corp.74

Of potential concern to Türkiye as it has banned trade with Israel, Heritage owns two shipping services companies registered in Istanbul: Shiptech Maritime Ltd.75 and Limosa Trading Logistics Inc.76

Shiptech Maritime was founded in March 2022, according to the Turkish trade registry.77 In June 2024, Heritage became the company’s sole shareholder.78 On its website,79 Shiptech Maritime advertises itself as a provider of shipping services operating across several Turkish ports and terminals, including Ceyhan.

As of September 2024,80 Heritage became the single shareholder of Limosa Trading Logistics Inc., an Istanbul-registered shipping services company established by a Turkish shipping company in May 2023.81 Limosa Trading Logistics advertises itself as a “strategic partner for petroleum and petrochemical trading and logistics.”82

On 2 May 2024, Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade announced that it had suspended all trade with Israel as a direct response to Israel’s crimes in Gaza. Yet, as noted above, Kpler data show that just six months later Heritage began chartering crude oil to Israel, with all shipments departing from Türkiye.

According to Reuters, in November 2024 Türkiye claimed that exporters using Ceyhan port “respected its decision to end trade with Israel” and that oil was not being loaded with Israel as the destination.83 However, Kpler data and further media reporting suggest that Turkish authorities may not be enforcing the export ban.84

An additional question arises about whether Turkish companies that enable export of goods to Israel fall within the boundaries of the country’s export ban. It is not clear whether Shiptech and/or Limosa play a role in Heritage’s oil trade from Türkiye to Israel. However, if they were to directly support Heritage’s chartering of crude oil bound for Israel with loading and tugboat or other services in Turkish ports, this would be enabling a prohibited activity, and should be investigated further.

Replying to SOMO and OCI’s request for comment, Shiptech on behalf of itself and Heritage, stated that neither Shiptech nor Heritage were violating Türkiye’s trade ban and were never “engaged in the sale, purchase, transportation or trading of crude oil with Israel”.85 Shiptech did not comment on whether the company was involved in providing shipping services in Turkish ports for chartered shipments of crude oil bound for Israel.86 Following up on this communication, SOMO and OCI wrote to Shiptech detailing the different data sources for the findings: Kpler and LSEG data confirm Heritage’s chartering of crude oil shipments to Israel. Inspection data from Port State control records Heritage as the charterer of some of the vessels around the time of the relevant shipments to Israel. Satellite imagery confirms that several of the identified vessels docked and offloaded at Israeli ports at relevant times. Shiptech declined to comment further.87

Stop oil shipments to Israel

Israel has been widely and credibly reported to be committing crimes under international law, including the crime of genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip,88 while maintaining an illegal occupation, apartheid regime, and unlawful settlements in the Palestinian territory.89 Israel’s military is central to the commission of these crimes. States and private actors that supply goods or services to Israel, which can reasonably be supposed to enable the commission of these crimes or enable them to be carried out on a larger scale than would otherwise be the case, may themselves be complicit. At the very least, they are knowingly supplying, or allowing the supply of, material that can contribute to the commission of crimes.

States that allow the supply of materials which can be used for military purposes may also be in breach of their legal obligations, under the Genocide Convention, to “employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible”.90 Additionally they would be acting against the July 2024 determination of the International Court of Justice, which made clear that states must “abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel […] which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory”, and must “take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israeli in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.91

Fuel is a necessary component of most of the unlawful acts committed by Israel detailed above. The military cannot operate without fuel. Israeli institutions cannot perpetuate genocide, apartheid, and illegal occupation without fuel. An important source of fuel in Israel, including for the military, is imported crude oil, which is refined in domestic refineries.

To comply with their obligations under the Genocide Convention and adhere to the ICJ’s weighty recommendations on trade and economic relations with Israel vis-à-vis its occupation of Palestine, states should prevent the export and transport of oil to Israel.

While crude and refined oil have legitimate civilian uses, in the context of Israel’s unrelenting commission of crimes under international law, the clear link between imported crude oil and the supply of fuel to the military, and the equally clear evidence of the military’s use of fuel to maintain the unlawful occupation and commit atrocities, the legitimacy of curtailing the flow of oil is also clear.

States have multiple levers to curtail and prevent shipments of oil. These include, but are not limited to, exercising their jurisdiction and legitimate leverage over oil companies and the host of enabler companies involved in the oil trade to stop transfers to Israel.

This briefing has exposed the role played by oil commodity traders as the charterers of vessels that transport crude oil and the companies that service oil shipping. They include companies operating in Türkiye, a state that has banned trade with Israel but apparently has not effectively enforced this ban, as well as companies based in Greece and the United Arab Emirates. All states should take effective regulatory measures to ensure that corporations domiciled in their jurisdiction cannot trade or facilitate the shipment of crude oil to Israeli refineries.  More specifically:

  • Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and all other oil exporting countries should impose an oil embargo on Israel, and must ensure contractually, for example through an end user declaration, that companies buying their oil do not supply or facilitate supply to Israel.
  • Türkiye should take robust measures to enforce its trade ban including by preventing the transit of crude via its territory if it is destined for export to Israel’s refineries. It should not allow companies to facilitate the transit, docking, and servicing at their ports of vessels carrying or getting loaded with crude oil destined for Israel.92
  • Countries which are home to entities that facilitate oil trading, such as the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Russia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Luxembourg should establish prohibitions on facilitating any form of trade or transport of oil to Israel as an action to give force and effect to their obligations under international law.

This briefing has named only a small, albeit important, number of companies involved in oil trading and chartering to Israel. Greater transparency on the many other companies, almost certainly spread over many more countries, involved in the oil trade would allow more states to act. OCI, SOMO, and many others have called for an embargo on oil to Israel. It is only by identifying the vast web of companies that are currently enabling the deliveries that such an embargo can be enforced. Conversely, each avenue or route for oil transfers that is shut down adds to the pressure to end the grave abuses Israel continues to perpetrate.

While much of this briefing is addressed to states, the companies involved are put on notice. Companies cannot hide behind the inaction of states. Under international criminal law, companies and corporate executives providing material support, such as crude oil that is refined and which the Israeli army uses in the commission of these violations could be held liable as “accomplices”, where that supply has a “substantial effect” on the commission of those crimes and they were aware of the substantial likelihood of this happening.93

Regulatory action aimed at depriving Israel of the fuel supply that sustains its violations of international law is both key and long overdue. 

Appendix

Endnotes

  1. Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, International Court of Justice, 19 July 2024, paras. 265-266, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order of 26 January 2024, International Court of Justice, accessed 13 June 2026, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order of 28 March 2024, International Court of Justice, accessed on 13 June 2026, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order of 24 May 2024, International Court of Justice, accessed 13 June 2026, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf; Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2025,” April 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east/israel-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territory/report-israel-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territory/; Office of the UN High Commissioner For Human Rights, “UN Experts Denounce Aggression on Iran and Lebanon, Warn of Devastating Regional Escalation,” 12 March 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-experts-denounce-aggression-iran-and-lebanon-warn-devastating-regional; Office of the UN High Commissioner For Human Rights, “UN Experts Condemn Israel’s Unprecedented Bombing in Lebanon After Ceasefire Announcement, Demand Immediate Halt to Hostilities,” 15 April 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/un-experts-condemn-israels-unprecedented-bombing-lebanon-after-ceasefire; International Commission of Jurists, “Iran/United States/Israel: Unlawful Attacks Must Cease,” 1 March 2026, icj.org/iran-united-states-israel-unlawful-attacks-must-cease.
  2. Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2025.”
  3. “US-Israel Attacks on Iran: Death Toll and Injuries Live Tracker,” Al Jazeera, 1 March 2026, last updated 10 June 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/us-israel-attacks-on-iran-death-toll-and-injuries-live-tracker.
  4. George Gray Molina et al., “Military Escalation in the Middle East: Reversals in Global Development, Policy Response Options,” UNDP, 13 April 2026, p. 3, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2026-04/undp-military-escalation-in-the-middle-east-reversals-global-development.pdf.
  5.  International Energy Agency, “Israel,” accessed 20 August 2026, https://www.iea.org/countries/israel/oil.
  6. Lydia de Leeuw, Max Lamb, and Misa Norigami, Powering Injustice, SOMO, p. 17, 19, 20, and 34, https://www.somo.nl/powering-injustice/.
  7. Most recently, Palestinian-led and worker-led research on Vitol’s role in Israeli oil imports included a call to action for oil and dock workers, Indigenous and frontline communities resisting extraction, and solidarity movements, see “Choking the War Machine: Vitol Supplies Oil for Genocide”, Palestinian Initiative for Climate Strategy and Disrupt Power, April 2026, https://palclimateinitiative.org/publications/choking-the-war-machine-vitol-supplies-oil-for-genocide.
  8. “Behind the Barrel: An Update on the Origins of Israel’s Fuel Supply,” Oil Change International, November 2025, p. 2, https://oilchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Behind-the-Barrel-3.pdf.
  9. “Fact Sheet: Chevron Fuels Israeli Apartheid and War Crimes,” Action Center for Corporate Accountability, January 2025, https://afsc.org/chevron-fuels-israeli-apartheid-and-war-crimes; Nina Lakhani and Ajit Niranjan, “Countries Fueling Israel’s Gaza War May be Complicit in War Crimes, Experts Warn,” The Guardian, 20 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/20/israel-war-gaza-fuel-war-crimes-warning.
  10. “Pipeline to Genocide. BP’s Oil Route to Israel,” Energy Embargo for Palestine, 9 September 2024, https://www.tni.org/en/article/pipeline-to-genocide.
  11. Nina Lakhani, “Revealed: How the Global Oil Industry is Fueling Israel’s War on Gaza,” The Guardian, 14 March 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/14/global-oil-industry-impact-israel-gaza-war.
  12. Lakhani, “Revealed: How the global oil industry is fueling Israel’s war on Gaza.”
  13. Lakhani, “Revealed: How the global oil industry is fueling Israel’s war on Gaza.”
  14. “Behind the Barrel: New Insights into the Countries and Companies Behind Israel’s Fuel Supply,” Oil Change International, August 2024, https://www.oilchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/behind-the-barrel-august-2024-v3.pdf; Lakhani and Niranjan, “Countries Fueling Israel’s Gaza War May be Complicit in War Crimes, Experts Warn.”
  15. Michael Arria, “International Activists Target Oil Tanker Supplying Military Fuel to Israel,” truthout, 5 August 2024, https://truthout.org/articles/international-activists-target-oil-tanker-supplying-military-fuel-to-israel/.
  16. For previous reports analysing other aspects of the supply chain, see https://oilchange.org/behind-the-barrel/.
  17. Kpler data.
  18. Kpler data.
  19. Kpler data.
  20. Kpler data.
  21. According to Kpler data about 40 percent of crude oil shipments to Israel during that timeframe do not list a charterer. The full data can be found in the Appendix.
  22. Europe Asia Pipeline Company was previously called Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company.
  23. Kpler data.
  24. Ronit Morgenstern, “Netanyahu Wants to Pump Oil from the Gulf through Israel. Reality Flows in a Different Direction,” Mako, 23 March 2026,https://www.mako.co.il/finances-news/Article-72cbb3d8a0a1d91026.htm; Sue Surkes, “State proposes extending secrecy for state-owned oil infrastructure firms,” The Times of Israel, 29 April 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/state-proposes-extending-secrecy-for-state-owned-oil-infrastructure-firms/#:~:text=The%20government%20is%20proposing%20to%20extend%20the,Pipeline%20Company%20for%20an%20additional%2018%20months; Sue Surkes, “Cabinet extends secrecy for state-owned oil infrastructure firms, despite objections,” The Times of Israel, 29 January 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/cabinet-extends-secrecy-for-state-owned-oil-infrastructure-firms-despite-objections/.
  25. The pipelines run from Ashkelon, Israel to 1) the Haifa refinery, 2) the Ashdod refinery, and 3) the Red Sea port of Eilat, see EPC, Pipelines, undated, https://engarchive.eapc.co.il/the-crude-oil-system/pipelines/; Ashdod Refinery Ltd., Financial Statements, 31 December 2024,  https://arf.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Ashdod-Refinery-FS-31.12.2024.pdf.
  26. State of Israel Ministry of Energy, “The Structure of the Energy Sector in Israel,” March 2021, p. 3, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/israel_energy_sector/en/israel_energy_sector_en.pdf.
  27. EACP, “2022 Corporate Responsibility Report,” 2022, p. 11, https://engarchive.eapc.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/EAPC-ESG-eng-2022.pdf.
  28. In its annual reports from both 2024 and 2025 Bazan states it supplied “diesel fuel for electricity and distillates production to the IDF [Israeli army] both directly or through resellers”, see Bazan Group Oil Refineries Ltd., Periodic Report 2024, 2024, p. 23, https://media.bazan.co.il/bazan/media/2tqeergm/bazan-annual-report-2024.pdf; Bazan Group Oil Refineries Ltd., Periodic Report 2025, 2025, p. 37, https://media.bazan.co.il/bazan/media/qlhn0z05/bazan-q4-2025.pdf.
  29. “Bazan Group’s [sic] Take Part in the National Effort to Ensure the Continuity of Israel’s Energy Supply”

    , Bazan Group, YouTube, 7 December 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5i03fOMn0tA.

  30. According to its 2025 annual report, 28% of the group revenue that year came from direct fuel sales, including for aviation, which is described as “mainly ground handling, storage and supply services, and refuelling services for airlines and the Air Force”. Paz Group, 2025 Annual Report, on file with SOMO and OCI. See also Hagai Amit, “Expensive War: Soaring Jet Fuel Prices Double the Cost of Israel’s Iran Strikes,” Haaretz, March 23, 2026, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-03-23/ty-article/.premium/expensive-war-soaring-jet-fuel-prices-double-the-cost-of-israels-iran-strikes/0000019d-146c-df0e-abfd-f47d4aad0000; see also Who Profits Research Center, “Paz Energy,” accessed 11 June, 2026, https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3703?paz-oil-company.
  31. “Fuelling the Flames,” SOMO, p. 12, https://www.somo.nl/fuelling-the-flamesin-gaza/.
  32. Terry Macalister, “Vitol: World’s Biggest Energy Trader Emerges From the Shadows,” The Guardian, 1 June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/01/vitol-world-biggest-energy-trader-emerges-shadows.
  33. Vitol, “About Vitol,” accessed 12 June 2026, https://www.vitol.com/about/.
  34. Vitol, “Global Contact Details,” accessed 12 June 2026, https://www.vitol.com/contact/.
  35. Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés, “Vitol Holding II S.A. Consolidated Accounts 2024,” filed on 28 November 2025, document on file with OCI and SOMO.
  36. Silvie Lang and Manuel Abebe, “War and Crises – Andine Commodity Traders are Making Record Profits,” Public Eye, 19 January 2023, https://www.publiceye.ch/en/topics/soft-commodities/war-and-crises-and-commodity-traders-are-making-record-profits.
  37. Vitol, “Vitol 2025 Volumes and Review,” accessed 12 June 2026, https://www.vitol.com/vitol-2025-volumes-and-review/.
  38. Vitol, “Vitol 2025 Volumes and Review.”
  39. “Vitol: The Secretive Trading Giant Minting Fortunes for its Employees,” Financial Times, 2 September 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/e18f477a-926d-4dd7-9042-aa3466c91ec1.
  40. Kpler data. Out of the total, nearly 7.6 million barrels were Azeri BTC crude, 5.1 million barrels were Kazakh crude and 1 million barrels were Nembe crude. Azeri BTC grade/blend oil is crude oil originating from Azerbaijan, transported via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which runs from Baku, Azerbaijan, via Tbilisi, Georgia, to Ceyhan, a Mediterranean port city in Türkiye, from where it is transferred for maritime shipment. See also https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/AZE.
  41. Kpler data and OCI/SOMO research, see subsequent footnotes.
  42. Kpler data. “Suezmaxes,” Kyklades Maritime Corporation, accessed 14 June 2026, https://www.kykmar.gr/suezmaxes/; “The Company,” Kyklades Maritime Corporation, accessed 14 June 2026, https://www.kykmar.gr/the-company/.
  43. Kpler data. Okeanis Eco Tankers, 2025 Annual Report, filed on 20 March 2026, accessed 20 August 2026, p. 53, https://www.okeanisecotankers.com/media/6a6c94176bad6.pdf; Okeanis Eco Tankers, Second Quarter and Six Month Period 2025: Condensed Financial Results, 12 August 2025, https://www.okeanisecotankers.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/OET-Q2-2025-Results.pdf, page was taken offline but the content as of 14 August 2025 is still visible at https://web.archive.org/web/20250814001808/okeanisecotankers.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/OET-Q2-2025-Results.pdf, last accessed on 20 August 2026. See also “Fleet,” Okeanis Eco Tankers, accessed 14 June 2026, https://www.okeanisecotankers.com/fleet/.
  44. Kpler data. “Tankers,” Thenamaris Ships Management, accessed 14 June 2026, https://www.thenamaris.com/fleets/thenamaris-fleet/tankers/.
  45. Email sent to SOMO by Thenamaris Corporate Communications on 24 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  46. Andres Mourenza, “The Phantom Fleet Fueling Israel’s Wars,” El Pais, 2 May 2026, https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-05-02/the-phantom-fleet-fueling-israels-wars.html.
  47. Kpler data.
  48. Sue Surkes, “State Proposes Extending Secrecy for State-Owned Oil Infrastructure Firms.”
  49. Malcolm Moore and Jamie Smyth, “Donald Trump’s First Venezuela Oil Sale Deal Goes to Megadonor’s Company,” Financial Times, 15 January 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/da74c248-fb36-4ff1-8fb2-d2dd1e00fde8.
  50. “Venezuelan Crude Cargo Leaves Israel Without Unloading,” Argus Media, 9 March 2026, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2798283-venezuelan-crude-cargo-leaves-israel-without-unloading.
  51. OpenSecrets Database lists a $500,000 donation by the trader to Turnout for America on 24 October 2024.
  52. Malcolm Moore and Jamie Smyth, “Donald Trump’s First Venezuela Oil Sale Deal Goes to Megadonor’s Company”; Shariq Khan, “Exclusive: Vitol Trader Addison, Architect of US-Venezuela Export Deal, Set to Retire, Sources Say,” Reuters, March 31, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/vitol-trader-addison-architect-us-venezuela-export-deal-set-retire-sources-say-2026-03-31/.
  53. Email sent to SOMO by Vitol’s Head of Corporate Affairs on 29 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  54. Aydin Calik, “Israel’s Haifa Refinery Shuts After Iran Missile Strike,” Argus Media, 17 June 2025,  https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2699702-israel-s-haifa-refinery-shuts-after-iran-missile-strike; “All Facilities at Haifa Oil Refinery Shut Down After Deadly Iran Missile Strike,” The Times of Israel, 17 June 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/all-facilities-at-haifa-oil-refinery-shut-down-after-deadly-iran-missile-strike/.
  55. Sumit Ritolia, “Refinery Status Monthly – September,” Kpler, 24 September 2025, https://www.kpler.com/blog/refinery-status-monthly—september.
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  57. Louis Wilson, “Shell & Vitol Bring Russian-Origin Diesel into Europe, Despite Swearing off Russian Oil,” Global Witness, 19 February 2023, https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/fossil-fuels/shell-vitol-bring-russian-origin-diesel-into-europe-despite-swearing-off-russian-oil/.
  58. Luke Pachymuthu, Randy Fabi, and Chen Aizhu, “Exclusive: Vitol Trades Iranian Fuel Oil, Skirting Sanctions,” Reuters, 26 September 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/business/exclusive-vitol-trades-iranian-fuel-oil-skirting-sanctions-idUSBRE88P06D/.
  59. Pachymuthu, Fabi, and Aizhu, “Exclusive: Vitol Trades Iranian Fuel Oil, Skirting Sanctions.”
  60. Email sent to SOMO by Vitol’s Head of Corporate Affairs on 29 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  61. Edith Honan, “Swiss Firm Vitol Pleads Guilty in UN Oil/Food Case,” Reuters, 20 November 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/swiss-firm-vitol-pleads-guilty-in-un-oilfood-case-idUSN20582111/
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  63. Email sent to SOMO by Vitol’s Head of Corporate Affairs on 29 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  64. Email sent to SOMO by Vitol’s Head of Corporate Affairs on 29 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  65. “Home Page,” Heritage Petroleum FZCO, accessed 20 August 2026, https://www.heritagepetrol.com/.
  66. “Heritage Petroleum FZCO,” LinkedIn, accessed 20 August 2026, https://www.linkedin.com/company/heritage-petroleum-dmcc-uae/.
  67. DMCC, “Explore DMCC,”accessed 20 August 2026, https://dmcc.ae/#:~:text=DMCC%20for%20business,thrive%20in%20a%20vibrant%20ecosystem.
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  70. Kpler data.
  71. Kpler data.
  72. Kpler data. Comparing total volumes of shipments between January 2025 and May 2026, Vitol has been the biggest charterer recorded in Kpler data, followed by Heritage.
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  75. Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi (Turkish Trade Registry Gazette), Issue No. 11111, 28 June 2024, p. 1462. Document on file with OCI and SOMO.
  76. Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi (Turkish Trade Registry Gazette), Issue No. 11160, 9 September 2024, p. 281. Document on file with OCI and SOMO.
  77. Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi (Turkish Trade Registry Gazette), Issue No. 10537, 15 March 2022, p. 74. Document on file with OCI and SOMO.
  78. Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi (Turkish Trade Registry Gazette), Issue No. 11111, 28 June 2024, p. 1462. Document on file with OCI and SOMO.
  79. “Home Page,” Shiptech Maritime, accessed 20 August 2026, https://www.shiptechagency.com/.
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  82. “About us”, Limosa, https://www.limosa.net/, page was taken offline. Content as of 20 April 2026 is still visible via https://web.archive.org/web/20260420101946/https://www.limosa.net/, last accessed on 20 August 2026.
  83. Sudarshan Varadhan, “Israel’s Imports of Azerbaijani Oil via Turkey Jump Despite Ankara’s Trade Ban,” Reuters, 21 January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israels-imports-azerbaijani-oil-via-turkey-jump-despite-ankaras-trade-ban-2026-01-21/.
  84. Andres Mourenza, “The Phantom Fleet Fueling Israel’s Wars.”
  85. Email sent to SOMO by Shiptech’s Head of Operation on 25 June 2026, responding to a right of reply email from SOMO and OCI sent on 22 June 2026.
  86. SOMO and OCI sent a second request for comment to Shiptech by email on 14 July 2026, and followed up with a phone call to Shiptech on 27 July 2026.
  87. In a phone call on 28 July 2026, Shiptech’s Head of Operation stated it would not respond to OCI and SOMO’s second email, sent on 14 July 2026.
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Cite this work

“Behind the Barrel: The Oil Traders Fueling Israel’s Genocide.” Oil Change International, September 3, 2026, https://oilchange.org/publications/vitol-heritage-fzco-israel-oil/.